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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTIONS BY RECEIVERS
By WILLIAM H. Rosa*
M ANY changes have taken place in this country since the con-
cepts which surround equity receiverships first began to
crystallize. From a union of thirteen semi-independent com-
munities, isolated by barriers of poor roads, delayed communica-
tion, and the psychological but real impediment of territorial
sovereignty, we have integrated into a vast federation, unhampered
by commercial subdivisions, where business solvency is a matter
of universal as opposed to provincial state concern. Doctrines of
local economic sufficiency have succumbed to a recognition of
national financial interdependence. Merchants are less conscious
of state lines in their dealings with one another. An insolvency in
Chicago may be of equal importance to creditors in New York,
San Francisco or New Orleans. And so modern business de-
mands that all of a debtor's general creditors share equally, re-
gardless of their residence or the fortuitous location of assets.
Under such conditions a receiver takes office. Charged with
the duty of converting property into money and of salvaging from
a financial wreck as large an amount as possible for the benelit
of creditors, he soon learns that the diffusion of his princil)al's
assets among several states produces special problems. Debtors
must be sued in other courts. Claims against stockholders must
be enforced in various jurisdictions. Fraudulent transfers must
be pursued and recovered. Property situated at a distance must
be protected from attachments and forced sales brought by iii-
petuous creditors.
Thus a receiver's duties may frequently lead him into foreign
courts whose conduct will contribute directly to the success or
failure of his general undertaking. If they fail or refuse to
supply him with rules and practice commensurate with his
needs, his inability to accomplish the ends desired of a liquidator
of a modern business will be due to their neglect to furnish him
and society generally with proper machinery for the salvaging
process. It is to this phase of receivership law that this article
is devoted.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University Law School, Col-
umbus, Ohio.
EXTRA TERRITORIAL ACTIONS BY RECI EIRS
ASSIGNMrENTS BOTH BY COMMoN LAW AND BY STATurE
Since the powers and privileges which a receiver enjoys in a
foreign court are often closely related to the extraterritorial recog-
nition which is accorded assignments for the benefit of creditors,
we shall commence our discussion with a brief consideration of
that subject. At one time the legal maxim mobilia sequuntur
personam was the shibboleth for rationalizing the transfer of
personalty by the law of the owner's domicil.1 Commercial usage
dictated this rule so that a sale of personalty valid at the place of
transaction would be recognized everywhere, even as to property
located in other jurisdictions.' By analogy a voluntary common-
law assignment for benefit of creditors, enforceable where made
and not in conflict with some rule or policy of the situs, should
pass title to personalty wherever situated.3  But at this point a
discordant interest arose. If a foreign assignee could remove
property from a state, local creditors would lose the advantage of
attachment and with it the ability to satisfy their claims out of
such assets. They would have to share dividends equally with
other creditors and, what was similarly repugnant, must travel
miles over poor roads and for relatively long distances in order to
protect their claims.4 The desire to preserve the advantages of
'See: Story, Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., secs. 377, 383; Dicey, Conflict
of Laws, 4th ed., p. 585, Rule sec. 154.
2 %inor, Conflict of Laws, sec. 128; Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 4th ed..
p. 585, Rule sec. 154.
3 Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co., (1899) 173 U. S. 624, 628.
19 Sup. Ct. 545, 43 L. Ed. 835; Barnett v. Kinney, (1893) 147 U. S. 476.
13 Sup. Ct. 403, 37 L. Ed. 247; Livermore v. Jenckes, (1858) 21 How.
(U.S.) 126, 16 L. Ed. 55; Black v. Zacharie & Co., (1845) 3 How. (U.S.)
483, 11 L. Ed. 690; Van Wyck v. Read, (C.C. Fla. 1890) 43 Fed. 710;
Schuler v. Israel, (C.C. Mo. 1886) 27 Fed. 851; Atherton v. Ives, (C.C.
Ky. 1884) 20 Fed. 894; Campbell v. Colo. Coal & Iron Co., (1885) 9 Colo.
60, 10 Pac. 248; First Nat'l Bank of Rockville v. Walker, (1891) 61 Conn.
154, 23 Atl. 696; Walters & Walker v. Whitlock, (1860) 9 Fla. 86; Miller
v. Kernagher, (1876) 56 Ga. 155; Coflin, etc. v. Kelling, etc., (1886) 83
Ky. 649; Train v. Kendall, (1884) 137 .Mass. 366; McKey v. Swenson,
(1925) 232 Mich. 505, 205 N. W. 583; In re Page-Sexsmith Lumber Co.,
(1883) 31 Minn. 136, 16 N. W. 700; Askew v. LaCygne Bk., (1884) 83 Mo.
366; Roberts v. Mforcross, (1898) 69 N. H. 533. 45 Ad. 50: Frazier v.
Fredericks, (1853) 24 N. J. L. 162; Ockerman v. Cross, (1873) 54 N. Y.
29; Fuller v. Steiglitz, (1874) 27 Ohio St. 355; Speed v. May, (1851) 17
Pa. St. 91; Weider v. Maddox, (1886) 66 Tex. 372, 1 S. W. 168; Hanford
v. Paine, (1860) 32 Vt. 442; Greeg v. Sloan, (1882) 76 Va. 497; Segnitz
v. Garden City B. & T. Co., (1900) 107 X\is. 171, 83 N. W. 327. See
American Law Institute Restatement of Conflict of Laws, sec. 284; Loren-
zen, Cases on Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., note 1038-1040.
4
"But the difficulty, uncertainty, and cost of obtainingl just distribution
by domestic creditors in a foreign country, and their right to protection
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local attachment moved courts to refuse to recognize foreign
common-law assignments whenever the generally accepted rule,
that a voluntary transfer of chattels passes ubiquitous title, could
be circumvented. An infringement of some local law or policy
was sufficient? The argument sufficed that the law of the situs
ultimately governs transfers, and that only through comity do
states enforce foreign law.'
In the main, however, foreign voluntary common-law assign-
ments received extraterritorial recognition even as against the
by their own government, when necessary and rightful, may be another
reason authorizing the same conclusion," i.e., discrimination in favor of
local creditors. Johnson v. Parker, (1868) 4 Bush (Ky.) 149, 152. See
Heyer v. Alexander, (1884) 108 I11. 385, 395. This doctrine probably
receihed its impetus in our trade with English merchants who became
bankrupt. See Burk v. M'Clain, (1766) 1 H. & McH. (Md.) 236, 238. And
was carried over to the trade between the states. Booth v. Clark, (1854)
17 How. (U.S.) 322, 337, 15 L. Ed. 164. It is not uncommon to find courts
in their arguments for the non-recognition of assignments or receiverships
treating sister states as though they were foreign countries. "And it has
long since been held, that the states of the Union, for all except national
purposes, are to be regarded as foreign and independent of each other."
Warren v. The 'Union Nat. Bk., (1869) 7 Phila. (Pa.) 156. See also:
Buckner v. Finley, (1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 586, 590, 7 L, Ed. 528; Hoyt
v. Thompson, (1851) 5 N. Y. 320, 349.5Beirne & Burnside v. Patton, (1841) 17 La. 589; Chaffee v. The Fourth
Nat'l Bank, (1880) 71 Me. 514; In re Dalpay, (1889) 41 Minn. 532, 43
N. W. 564; Bryan v. Brisbin, (1858) 4 Bush. (Ky.) 423; But see Liver-
more v. Jenckes, (1858) 21 How. (U.S.) 126, 16 L. Ed. 55. Cf. Woolson v.
Pipher, (1884) 100 Ind. 306 with Savings B. & T. Co. v. Indianapolis
Lounge Co., (1898) 20 Ind. App. 325, 47 N. E. 856. Illinois respects
foreign assignments valid according to the law of the situs as against the
claims of nonresidents, but not as against claims of their own citizens;
Townsend v. Coxe, (1894) 151 Ill. 52, 37 N. E. 689; Consolidated Tank
Line Co. v. Collier, (1893) 148 Ill. 259, 35 N. E. 689; Juilliard & Co. v.
May, (1889) 130 Ill. 87, 22 N. E. 477; Woodward v. Brooks, (1889) 128
Ii. 222, 20 N. E. 685; May v. The First Nat'l Bank, (1887) 122 Il. 551,
13 N. E. 806; Heyer v. Alexander, (1884) 108 I11. 385; Henderson & Co.
v. Schaas, (1889) 35 Ill. App. 155; Sheldon v. Wheeler, (C.C. Ill. 1887)
32 Fed. 773. Citizens of the state where the assignment was made are
usually held bound: May v. Wannemacker, (1872) 111 Mass. 202; Thurston
v. Rosenfield, (1868) 42 Mo. 474; Green v. Gross, (1881) 12 Neb. 117:
Moore v. Bonnell, (1864) 31 N. J. L. 90; Bacon v. Home, (1889) 123
Pa. St. 452, 16 Ati. 794. If the property was within the jurisdiction of
the appointing court, although later removed, the assignment is respected.
Crapo v. Kelly, (1872) 83 U. S. 610, 21 L. Ed. 430; Richardson v. Leavitt.
(1846) 1 La. Ann. 430; Guillander v. Howell, (1866) 35 N. Y. 657. See
generally: Sunderland, Foreign Voluntary Assignments for the Benefit of
Creditors, (1903) 2 Mich. L. Rev. 112, 180; Wharton, Conflict of Laws,
3rd ed., sec. 353.
6"As a voluntary assignment, valid in the state where made, is enforced
in this state as a matter of comity, our courts will not enforce it to the
prejudice of our citizens who may have demands against the assignor."
Woodward v. Brooks, (1889) 128 Ill. 222, 227, 20 N. E. 685. American
Law Institute, Conflict of Laws Restatement, sees. 275-278; Dicey, Con-
flict of Laws, 4th ed., 589; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 350.
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claims of creditors resident at this situs.7 This was not so in the
field of statutory assignments.8 Here the analog), to sales was
further removed. Whether an assignment was voluntary or in
invitum, its operation was the product of a legislative act which
had merely local effect. This sufficiently distinguished its bearing
on foreign assets from that of a conveyance by omnipresent com-
mon law.'
In the administration of local assignments, as distinguished
from the recognition of foreign ones, the constitution 0 was held
to demand equal treatment among the citizens of the several
states." Sometimes this admonition was advanced as the reason
7Local statutes are sometimes construed as inapplicable to foreign
assignments: Barnett v. Kinney, (1893) 147 U. S. 476, 13 Sup. Ct. 403,
37 L. Ed. 247; Memphis Say. Bk. v. Houchens, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1902)
115 Fed. 96; Coflin v. Kelling, (1886) 83 Ky. 649; Birdseye v. -Underhill,
(1888) 82 Ga. 142, 7 S. E. 863; Pittman v. Marquardt & Sons, (1898)
20 Ind. App. 531, 50 N. E. 894; Chafee v. The Fourth Nat'l Bank, (1880)
71 Me. 514; Moore v. T. & T. Co., (1896) 82 Md. 288, 33 At. 641;
In re Page-Sexsmith Lumber Co., (1883) 31 Minn. 136, 16 N. W. 700;
Ockerman v. Cross, (1873) 54 N. Y. 29; Prentice v. Coughran, (1916)
37 S. D. 191, 157 N. W. 319; Weider v. Maddox, (1886) 66 Tex. 372, 1
S. W. 168; Hanford v. Paine, (1860) 32 Vt. 442. Contra: Moore v.
Church, (1886) 70 Iowa 208, 30 N. W. 855; Douglas v. Bank, (1896) 97
Tenn. 133, 36 S. W. 874; by statute, Steel v. Goodwin, (1886) 113 Pa.
St. 288, 6 Ati. 49. See Stricker & Co. v. Tinkham, (1866) 35 Ga. 176;
Mason v. Stricker, (1867) 37 Ga. 262; Gregg v. Sloan, (1882) 76 Va. 497.
sChancellor Kent attempted in Holmes v. Remsen, (1820) 4 Johns Ch.
(N.Y,) 460 to adopt the English and European practice of recognizing
foreign insolvency actions, but he later had to admit that American authority
was against him. Kent, Commentaries, 14th ed. 405. A similar liberal
but abortive policy was advanced by a lower Ohio court: "It may also be
observed, that the state of Ohio, from its central and commercial position.
has an interest in adopting a liberal policy of this nature." Finnell v.
Burt, (1856) 2 Handy (Ohio) 202, 215.
9Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co., (1899) 173 U. S. 624,
628, 19 Sup. Ct. 545, 43 L. Ed. 835; Cole v. Cunningham, (1889) 133
U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. Ed. 538; Harrison v. Sterry, (1809) 5
Cranch (U.S.) 289, 3 L. Ed. 104; Betton v. Valentine, (C.C. RI. 1852)
1 Curt. 168, Fed. Cas. No. 1, 370; Mead v. Dayton, (1859) 28 Conn. 33;
Fox v. Adams, (1828) 5 Me. 245; Osborn v. Adams, (1836) 18 Pick.
(Mass.) 245; Wood v. Parson, (1873) 27 Mich. 159; Garbee v. Mason,
(1885) 64 N. H. 10, 4 Atl. 791; Willitts v. Waite, (1862) 25 N. Y. 577;
The Farmers B. & T. Co. v. The C. T. & 3. Co., (1930) 37 Ohio App. 54,
173 N. E. 743; Happy v. Prickett, (1901) 24 Wash. 290, 64 Pac. 528;
McClure v. Campbell, (1888) 71 Wis. 350, 37 N. W. 343. Cf. Maconchy v.
Delehanty, (1908) 11 Ariz. 366, 95 Pac. 109. A voluntary, statutory assign-
ment was upheld in Whitman v. Mast, (1895) 11 Wash. 318, 39 Pac. 649.
See Gilman v. Ketcham, (1893) 84 Wis. 60, 54 N. W. 395. Wharton,
Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., sec. 353a; American Law Institute, Conflicts
Restatement, sec. 285.
'
0Sec. 2 of art. 4.
"Blake v. McClung, (1898) 172 U. S. 239, 19 Sup. Ct. 165, 43 L. Ed.
432. Foreign corporations are not included. Cf. Kentucky Finance Corp.
v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., (1923) 262 .U. S. 544, 43 Sup. Ct.
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for disregarding involuntary or state bankruptcy assignments in
cases which involved attachments by creditors of sister states.
But in this the practice was not uniform."- In a few instances
even citizens of the state where the involuntary proceeding was
pending were permitted to attach.
1 3
THE DOCTRINE OF Boo-rii v. CLARK
Such was the discordant background of assignment law into
which modern receivership doctrine was born, and to which in
many instances it has fallen heir. To discuss its growth means
to commence with the case of Booth 7,. Clark," the rule of which
636, 67 L. Ed. 1112. It is easier to explain this distinction between ad-
ministration and recognition than to justify it economically. The Supreme
Court in the interests of local creditors has already placed its benediction
on the non-recognition of foreign assignments. Security Trust Co. v.
Dodd, Mead & Co., (1899) 173 U. S. 624, 628, 19 Sup. Ct. 545, 43 L. Ed.
835; Barnett v. Kinney, (1893) 147 U. S. 476, 481, 13 Sup. Ct. 403, 37 L.
Ed. 247; Harrison v. Sterry, (1809) 5 Cranch (U.S.) 289, 302, 3 L. I'd.
104. Distribution and recognition are distinct matters. Demand for equality
regardless of state lines in the former rests upon an interpretation of the
constitution. Acknowledgment of privilege in the latter depends upon the
political theory of territoriality. To it the wording of the constituion has
not been extended. Nor is discrimination immediately apparent when an
assignment is refused recognition. In an individual case there is no in-
equality. The instrument fails as a whole. It is only in surveying an
extended practice of the courts that we find actual preference on the basis
of citizenship. Yet the protection of local creditors is as indigenous to the
one class of cases as to the other. They are distinguishable only in .their
factual set-ups and in the means used to obtain their mutual objective--
favoritism toward home creditors. Discrimination in the aggregate num-
ber of cases by extending recognition to foreign assignments when local
creditors will not be injured, but by refusing it when they are involved, is
discrimination nevertheless. See generally: Power of a State to Prefer
Local Creditors of an Insolvent as to Property Within the State, (1929)
77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1001.
1-Paine v. Lester, (1876) 44 Conn. 196, 204; Franzen v. Hutchinson,
(1895) 94 Iowa 95, 99, 62 N. W. 698; Beer v. Hooper, Son & Co., (1856)
32 Miss. 246; Sturtevant v. Armsly Co., (1891) 66 N. H. 557. 23 Atd. 368.
Contra: Chafee v. Fourth Nat'l Bk., (1880) 71 Me. 514; Sanderson v.
Bradford, (1839) 10 N. H. 260 (attaching creditor was a foreigner);
Long v. Girdwood, (1892) 150 Pa. St. 413, 24 Ati. 711 (foreigner). Cf.
Milne v. Moreton, (1814) 6 Binn. (Pa.) 353.
'AUprton v. Hubbard, (1859) 28 Conn. 274; Rhawn v. Pearse, (1884)
110 Ill. 350; Moore v. Church, (1886) 70 Iowa 208, 30 N. W. 855; Barth
v. Backus, (1892) 140 N. Y. 230, 35 N. E. 425; Bank v. Motherwell Iron
Etc. Co., (1895) 95 Tenn. 172, 31 S. W. 1003. Contra: Burk v. M'Clain,
(1766) 1 H. & McH. (Md.) 236; Einer v. Detnoodt. (1866) 39 Mo. 69;
Hoag v. Hunt, (1850) 21 N. H. 106; Mulliken v. Aughinbaugh, (1829)
1 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 117. Cf. Eddy v. Winchester, (1880) 60 N. 1-. 63
with Kidder v. Tufts, (1868) 48 N. H. 121. And see: Wallace v. Pater-
son, (1790) 2 H. & McI. (Md.) 463; In re Waite, (1885) 99 N. Y. 433,
2 N. E. 440.
14(1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 322. 15 L. Ed. 164. See generally: Hamilton,
Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction of Receivers, (1883) 22 Am. Law Reg. 289;
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has had so great an influence both in state and in federal deci-
sions. The action began with a creditor's bill filed in a New York
court by Camara against Clark. Booth was appointed receiver.
The assets consisted chiefly of a claim against the Mexican Gov-
eminent, which appeared so worthless that Booth made no effort
to have it assigned to him. Later Clark moved into New Hamnp-
shire where he took advantage of the federal bankruptcy act.
The Mexican claim, which was scheduled in this proceeding, was
purchased by Clark in his sister's name and transferred to him.
Thereafter the federal government recovered $86,786.29 for Clark.
The assignee then succeeded in setting aside the sale to Clark's
sister, thereby recovering his lost ground. 5 Booth instituted the
present action in Washington, D. C., and the contest was treated
as substantially one between the receiver and the assignee over a
sufficient portion of the fund to satisfy Camara's judgment. The
dismissal of Booth's bill in the trial court was sustained by the
Supreme Court.
Little criticism can be found with the decision. By not ob-
taining an assignment Booth failed to protect Camara. The bank-
ruptcy act conveyed the claim to the assignee. Although equally
credulous, he deserved the reward. Also, the ruling secured an
equable distribution of assets. It is the court's rationalization of
its conclusion that has caused the trouble.
The case turned on the receiver's privilege of suing in a for-
eign court. Booth urged that the New York decree entitled him
as domiciliary receiver to all of Clark's assets. These included
this chose in action on the theory that it followed Clark's person
and was within the jurisdiction of the appointing court. The
comity of nations permitted him to maintain his action. The
Supreme Court, however, held that although Booth's alppointment
was under a statute, his interest in the fund was merely that of
an equity receiver. Equity acting in personam could have forced
an assignment but did not do so. The court's industry was taxed
in vain "to find a case in which a receiver has been permitted to sue
in a foreign jurisdiction for the property of a debtor.""a
Bolles, The Law Governing Foreign Receivers, (1909) 18 Yale L. J. 488:
Laughlin, The Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers, (1932) 45 Harv. I..
Rev. 429; First, Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers, (1932) 27 In1. L.
Rev. 271; (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 943; (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 593,
757; (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1322.
'
5 Clark v. Clark, (1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 315, 15 L. Ed. 77.16Booth v. Clark, (1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 322, 334, 15 L. Eld. 164.
"We think that a receiver has never been recognized by a foreign tribunal
as an actor in a suit." Ibid.
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Booth insisted that since he was a statutory receiver he was
entitled to a lien on his debtor's assets, which should be re-
spected just as the lien of an assignee in bankruptcy should be. This
reasoning, however, did not convince the court. It admitted that
under the doctrine of comity an English court would recognize a
foreign bankruptcy assignment and that such might be the con-
tinental rule." But recognition was not the original practice in
England. When it was first announced, she had become a great
creditor nation. If English assignments in bankruptcy were to
be recognized abroad, she felt that she must concede a similar
effect to those made in other countries. Her former policy,
therefore, succumbed to the demands of a new self-interost created
by an increased commercial intercourse.
Somehow the wisdom of applying the English rule to states
of the Union did not impress the court. Our doctrine developed
in colonial days before the reversal of English policy. Although
the change took place before the Revolution, knowledge of it did
not reach our shores until after the two countries had separated.
The rule of the colonies was that of the courts in 1854.18
Since an assignment under state bankruptcy laws received no
extraterritorial force in this country as against the claim of an
attaching creditor of the forum,1 9 it seemed to the court that the
relation of an equity receiver to the appointing tribunal was not
altered merely because the appointment was founded upon a
statute instead of upon the inherent powers of the court. In
either event it was purely local. Nor was such a receiver entitled
to a privilege of foreign action on the basis of comity-and espe-
cially in this case since, as the court thought, his lack of vigilance
had produced his predicament.
So in holding that because of the receiver's inability to sue
abroad the lower court was correct in dismissing his petition, the
Supreme Court did more than sanction the use of a rule of pro-
cedure. It set up a procedural device by which courts might deter-
mine for all practical purposes the substantive interest of future
litigants. This was the birth of the federal doctrine that an
equity receiver may not sue outside of the jurisdiction in which
"17Booth v. Clark, (1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 322, 336, 15 L. Ed. 164.
Cf. Lorenzen, Cases on Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., 1085: "The doctrine of
the extraterritorial effect or universality of bankruptcy proceedings is not
carried through consistently in any jurisdiction."
18Booth v. Clark, (1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 322, 336, 15 L. Ed. 164.
19Supra notes 8 and 9.
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he is appointed.: Its growth and exceptions, and its effect upon
state courts must now be traced.
EXCEPTIONS TO AND CRITICISMS OF TIlE FEDERAL RULE
That the restricting doctrine of Booth v. Clark should prove
too burdensome was to be expected. The utility of the receiver-
ship device was becoming increasingly apparent,:1 but its avail-
ability was handicapped by the rule of that case. Yet even that
opinion recognized an escape through the medium of title.22 In
1879 a case arose2 3 in which Louisiana creditors of an insolvent
Missouri insurance company sought by means of a receivership
in the state court to reserve local assets for their separate benefit.
Relfe, the Missouri superintendent of insurance, who had been
appointed statutory successor of the corporation, petitioned for
removal to the federal court. The Louisiana receiver's motion to
remand the case questioned Relfe's capacity to petition in a for-
eign court. He was sustained. In reversing the ruling the Su-
preme Court stressed the fact that Relfe was not a court officer.
He was a state official, a statutory successor of a corporation and
a trustee of an express trust. The inconvenience engendered by
the rule of Booth v. Clark was thereby limited to equity receiver-
ships, and the device of statutory successor, applicable in proper
20Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, (1922) 262 U. S. 77. 43
Sup. Ct 480, 67 L. Ed. 871; Sterrett v. Sec. Nat'l Bk., (1918) 248 U. S.
73, 39 Sup. Ct. 27, 63 L. Ed. 135; Gt. Western Mining Co. v. Harris,
(1904) 198 U. S. 561, 25 Sup. Ct. 770, 49 L. Ed. 1163; Hale v. Allison,
(1902) 188 U. S. 56, 23 Sup. Ct. 244, 47 L. Ed. 380; Booth v. Clark, (1854)
17 How. (U.S.) 322, 15 L. Ed. 164; Standard Bonding Warehouse Co.
.. Cooper & Griffin Inc., (D.C. N.C. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 842; The Wabash,
(D.C. Conn. 1923) 296 Fed. 559; U. S. Mtg. & Tr. Co. v. Mo. K. & T. Ry.
Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 458; McConnell v. Hubbard. (C.C.A.
2nd Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 961; Sterrett v. Second Nat'l Bank, (C.C.A. 6th
Cir. 1917) 246 Fed. 753; Coal & Iron Co. v. Reherd, (C.C.A. 4th Cir.
1913) 204 Fed. 859; Fairview Fluor-Spar & Lead Co. v. Ulrich, (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1911) 192 Fed. 894; Bluefields S. S. Co. v. Steele, (C.C.A. 3rd
Cir. 1911) 184 Fed. 584; Covell v. Fowler, (C.C. Ill. 1906) 144 Fed. 535;
Fowler v. Osgood, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1905) 141 Fed. 20; Edwards v. Nat.
Window Glass Jobbers' Ass'n, (C.C. N.J. 1905) 139 Fed. 795; Hilliker
v. Hale, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1902) 117 Fed. 220; Wigton v. Bosler, (C.C.
Pa. 1900) 102 Fed. 70; Hazard v. Durant, (C.C. Mass. 1884) 19 Fed. 471;
Brigham v. Luddingtonj (C.C. N.Y. 1874) 12 Blatchf. 237, Fed. Cas.
No. 1, 874. See (1919) 3 MiNNEsoTA LAw REviEw 188.
21See: Davis v. Gray, (1872) 83 U. S. 203, 219, 21 L. Ed. 447; Hale
v. Hardon, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1899) 95 Fed. 747, 773.22Booth v. Clark, (1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 322, 329, 331, 333, 339,
15 L. Ed. 164.
23Relfe v. Rundle, (1880) 103 U. S. 222, 26 L. Ed. 337.
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instances to receiverships,2 ' was announced as an escape from tile
confining procedural doctrine of the earlier case.
This "title theory" has been extended further.2 It is sufficient
if a receiver is "a quasi assignee, and representative of the credi-
tors, and as such vested with the authority to maintain an action.1' 2"
Or he may have received an assignment of all the corporate or
individual assets, either by force of statute or by means of a con-
veyance from the debtor. 7  By any of these devices the procedural
difficulty may be removed which would otherwise prevent hin
from suing. But this only assures him of a forum in which he
may plead his cause."5 It does not guarantee that he will recover
foreign assets in a contest with local creditors. Nor can it brush
aside the territorial limitations which the Supreme Court recog-
nized in assignment cases. 29  He is still the representative of a
2-Ashcroft v. Bream, (D.C. Pa. 1931) 51 F. (2d) ; Good v. )err,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 411; Avery v. Boston Safe-Deposit
& Trust Co., (C.C. Mass. 1896) 72 Fed. 700.
'-"See Federal Practice Respecting Foreign Receiverships, (1930) 43
Harv. L. Rev. 805.
"6Bernheimer v. Converse, (1906) 206 U. S. 516, 534, 27 Sup. Ct.
755, 761, 51 L. Ed. 1163, 1176. Accord: Converse v. Minn. Thresher Mfg.
Co., (1909) 212 U. S. 567, 29 Sup. Ct. 691, 53 L. Ed. 654; Converse v.
Hamilton, (1911) 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749; Selig v.
Hamilton, (1914) 234 ,U. S. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. 926, 58 L. Ed. 1518; Irvine V.
Baker, (D.C. N.Y. 1915) 225 Fed. 834; Irvine v, Elliott, (D.C. Del. 1913)
203 Fed. 82; Irvine v. Putman, (C.C. N.Y. 1911) 190 Fed. 321; Irvine v.
Bankard, (C.C. Md. 1910) 181 Fed. 206; Hamilton v. Simon, (C.C. N.Y.)
1910) 178 Fed. 130: Irvine v. Putman, (C.C. Cal. 1909) 167 Fed. 174:
Converse v. Mears, (C.C. Wis. 1908) 162 Fed. 767. See: Hale v. tlardon,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1899) 95 Fed. 747; Rust v. United Waterworks tCo..
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1895) 70 Fed. 129; Cuykendall v. Miles, (C.C. Ma',.
1882) 10 Fed. 342.
-
t Hawkins v. Glenn, (1889) 131 U. S. 319, 9 Sup. Ct. 739, 33 I.. Ed.
184; Lion Bonding &-Security Co. v. Karatz, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1922) 280
Fed. 532; Hopkins v. Lancaster, (D.C. Ala. 1918) 254 Fed. 190; Kelly v.
Dolan, (D.C. Pa. 1914) 218 Fed. 966; Goss v. Carter, (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1907) 156 Fed. 746; American Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Benefit & Casualty
Co., (C.C. Colo. 1895) 70 Fed. 420. For the power of an equity court under
modern statutes to confer title see Cook, Powers of Courts of Equity.
(1915) 15 Col. L. Rev. 106, 126.2 8The name in which a foreign receiver should bring an action, and
the power (either statutory or by order of the appointing court) by which
he sues, are normally of secondary interest in this article. See I Clark.
Receivers, 2nd ed., sees. 582, 583, 587. However, in so far as the Supreme
Court has forbidden suits by receivers in the name of their debtors as a
means of circumventing interdiction against foreign actions by equity
receivers, they are of primary importance. See Great Western Mining
Co. v. Harris, (1904) 198 U. S. 561, 577, 25 Sup. Ct. 770, 49 L. Ed. 1163.
Cf. Gt. Western Telegraph Co. v. Purdy, (1895) 162 U. S. 329, 16 Sup.
Ct. 810, 40 L. Ed. 986. And see Coal & Iron Ry. v. Reherd, (C.C.A. 4th
Cir. 1913) 204 Fed. 859. Similarly where a statutory receiver is treated
as a quasi assignee.
-Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co., (1899) 173 -U. S. 624,
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foreign court suing to recover a res or a claim which is located
beyond the range of the law which governs both his appointment
and the conveyance.
In two classes of cases the Supreme Court has avoided the
peril of territoriality. It held in a suit which was brought to en-
force a stockholder's double liability that the receiver might not
only sue, but that he might recover. The theory was that tile
stockholder by his contract became a member of the corporation.
As such he was bound by the constitutional and statutory provi-
sions under which the company was formed and the liquidation
proceeding was instituted. The assessment was a part of the
procedure to which he was subject through the representation of
the corporation. As quasi assignee the receiver represented the
creditors and was the proper person to sue. Full faith and credit
must be given to the foreign action in which the anount of tile
assessment was determined.30
Also, public interest in the liquidation of insurance companies
has been strong enough to support the fiction that those who
contract for insurance do so with knowledge of the corporation's
charter and its charter rights. So when a company becomes in-
solvent, the claim of insured residents of the forum are subordi-
nated to the common interest of all insured persons as represented
by the foreign assignee-receiver. 31 But when the contract argu-
ment is not available, when a receiver is depending upon a statu-
tory title to enable him to recover an ordinary debt or an article
of personal property, the "title theory" fails to afford an avenue
of escape.32
While it is possible to rationalize the doctrine of Booth v.
Clark on the basis of accepted legal theory, to agree with it is
19 Sup. Ct. 545, 43 L. Ed. 835; Barnett v. Kinney, (1893) 147 U. S. 476,
13 Sup. Ct 403, 37 L. Ed. 247; Harrison v. Sterry, (1809) 5 Cranch
(U.S.) 289, 302, 3 L. Ed. 104. See Zacher v. Fidelity Trust & Safe-Vault
Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1901) 106 Fed. 593, 598.30Converse v. Hamilton, (1911) 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415. 56
L. Ed. 749; Bernheimer v. Converse, (1906) 206 U. S. 516. 27 Sup. Ct.
755, 51 L. Ed. 1163. See Whitman v. Oxford Nat'l Bk,. (1890) 17o U. S.
559, 20 Sup. Ct. 506, 44 L. Ed. 619. See: First, Extraterritorial Powers
of Receivers, (1932) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 271, 278, 282; Laughlin. The Extra-
territorial Powers of Receivers, (1932) 45 Har,. L. Rev. 429. 448 et seq.31Relfe v. Rundle, (1880) 103 U. S. 222, 226, 26 L. Ed. 337; Rundel v.
Life Ass'n of America, (C.C. La. 1882) 10 Fed. 720. See Parsons v.
Charter Oak L. Ins. Co., (C.C. Iowa 1887) 31 Fed. 305. See First,
Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers, (1932) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 271, 2-284;
Laughlin, The Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers, (1932) 45 Harv.
L. Rev. 429, 448 et seq.
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more difficult. 33  American tenets of territorial sovereignty and
jurisdictional limitations go hand-in-hand. Hence neither the
law nor its vicar as appointee of an equity court may demand ex
proprio vigore recognition in another sovereign territory. With
this reasoning there need be no quarrel. It is doubtless true that
as between states of the Union, or states and the federal govern-
ment, rules founded upon theories of separate political entity have
their time and place. Even as between different federal judicial
districts the limited powers of an equity judge may suffice to
explain the rule that a receiver may not of right sue in a foreign
court. But that the Supreme Court should deny him the privi-
lege of suing in a foreign court is a needless refinement of dogma.
The hardship which this refusal of comity causes is often in-
excusable. Both in federal and in state courts the sole means of
circumvention lies in the appointment of an ancillary receiver,34
with all of the uncertainty and additional expense which that pro-
cedure entails. Even in federal courts each appointment is treated
as an independent action.3 In no jurisdiction is a primary re-
ceiver assured that he will be selected as the appointee. The
32The federal attitude in this regard is shown supra notes nos. 3-9.33Where the territorial jurisdiction of state and federal courts overlap,
their respective receivers are not classed as foreign within the meaning of
the rule: Shields v. Coleman, (1895) 157 U. S. 168, 174, 15 Sup. Ct. 570,
39 L. Ed. 660; Harkin v. Brundage, (1928) 276 U. S. 36, 42, 48 Sup. Ct.
268, 72 L. Ed. 457; Grant v. Leach & Co., (1930) 280 U. S. 351, 362, 50
Sup. Ct. 107. 74 L. Ed. 470. Shull v. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.. (1917)
81 W. Va. 184, 188, 94 S. E. 123. A foreign receiver may file a claim in
bankruptcy: Ex parte Norwood, (D.C. I1. 1873) 3 Bissell 504, Fed. Cas.
No. 10, 364; In re Rep. Ins. Co., (D.C. Il. 1873) Fed. Cas. No. 11, 705.
8 N. B. R. 197. A few federal cases have broken away from the strict
rule where the interests of local creditors would not be jeopardized: Lewis
v. Clark, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1904) 129 Fed. 570; Lewis v. American Naval
Stores Co.. (C.C. La. 1902) 119 Fed. 391; Kirtley v. Holmes, (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1901) 107 Fed. 1; Rogers v. Riley, (C.C. Ky. 1896) 80 Fed. 759.
See: Burr v. Smith, (C.C. Ind. 1902) 113 Fed. 858, 862; Hale v. Ilardon.
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1899) 95 Fed. 747; Sands v. Greeley & Co., (C.C.A. 2nd
Cir. 1898) 88 Fed. 130. The local-creditor doctrine is not applied in
cases of claims against the United States Treasury. United States v.
Borcherling, (1902) 185 U. S. 223, 22 Sup. Ct. 607, 46 L. Ed. 884.34Fowler v. Osgood, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1905) 141 Fed. 20, 24. See
Great Western Mining Co. v. Harris, (1904) 198 U. S. 561, 577, 25 Sup.
Ct. 770, 49 L. Ed. 1163.35Fairview Fluor S. & L. Co. v. Ulrich, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1911) 192
Fed. 894; Shinney v. N. A. S. L. & B. Co., (C.C. Utah 1890) 97 Fed. 9.
Sands v. Greeley, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1898) 88 Fed. 130; Mercantile Tr.
Co. v. K. & 0. Ry., (C.C. W. Va. 1889) 39 Fed. 337. See Low v. Pressed
Metal Co., (1916) 91 Conn. 91, 99 Atl. 1. But not as to diversity of
citizenship. Bluefields S. S. Co. v. Steele, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1911) 184
Fed. 584. See also, Greene v. Star Cabs & Package Car Co., (C.C. Conn.
1900) 99 Fed. 656.
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judge may be of the opinion that the interests of local creditors
require the selection of someone else. If there is a contest the
petition for ancillary appointment may even be denied ;"' or the
power of refusal may be used to protect local attaching creditors
against the possibility of an equal distribution of assets.
Although the securing of an ancillary receivership solely as an
entr6e for filing local actions seems tortuous and needlessly bur-
densome, once obtained the beneficent result follows of placing
property in custodia legis, after which creditors, both local and
foreign, share equally.38 No one may attach for the court is a
sort of legal sanctuary-which is as it should be. But if, as one
court intimates,3 9 the function of an ancillary receivership is to
enable home creditors to reach funds of a debtor without causing
them the inconvenience of leaving the jurisdiction, this equal
protection is altruism with an ulterior motive. Indeed, as long as
the policy continues of respecting attachments by local creditors,
this auxiliary device will be a doubtful blessing. To guarantee
equality in the distribution of a debtor's estate, an ancillary re-
ceivership must be obtained simultaneously with the primary
one.
40
3rBluefields S. S. Co. v. Steele, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1911) 184 Fed. 584;
Clark v. S. C. 0. C. F., (1905) 146 Cal. 598, 80 Pac. 931; Flaacke v.
Winona Mills Co., (1926) 104 Conn. 665, 134 Atl. 265; Irvin Y. GraniteState Provident Ass'n, (1897) 56 N. J. Eq. 244, 246, 38 Atl. 680; Bank
v. Motherwell Iron etc. Co., (1895) 95 Tenn. 172, 31 S. W. 1003. In Mabon
v. The Ongley Electric Co., (1898) 156 N. Y. 196, 50 N. E. 805, refusal
was on the refreshing grounds of the extra expense and lack of need,
since, there being no local creditors, the foreign receiver could sue without
local appointment.37Clark v. S. C. 0. C. F., (1905) 146 Cal. 598, 80 Pac. 931.3SLocal creditors may be preferred in the order of dividend payments.
King v. Hiawatha Silk Mills Inc., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1924) 296 Fed. 907;
Brooks v. Smith, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1923) 290 Fed. 33; Beaver Board Co.
v. Imbrie & Co., (D.C. Ga. 1922) 282 Fed. 654; Pratt Lumber Co. v.
V. T. H. Gk. Co., (D.C. N.C. 1922) 278 Fed. 783; Pfabler v. McCrum-
Howell Co., (D.C. Wis. 1912) 197 Fed. 684; Brown v. Tishomingo Bk.
Co., (1917) 200 Ala. 613, 76 Atl. 971; Receivers Middlesex Banking Co. v.
Realty Inv. Co., (1926) 104 Conn. 206, 132 At. 390; Thornley v. J. C.
Walsh Co., (1910) 207 Mass. 62, 92 N. E. 1007; Buswell v. Order of the
Iron Hall, (1894) 161 Mass. 224, 36 N. E. 1065; Clark v. Painted Post
Lumber Co., (1918) 89 N. Y. Eq. 409, 104 Atl. 728; People v. Granite State
Provident Ass'n, (1900) 161 N. Y. 492, 55 N. E. 1053; Drury v. Doherty,(1926) 127 Misc. Rep. 263, 215 N. Y. S. 613; 1919 R. S. Missouri sec.
255; Brunner v. York Bridges Co., (1916) 78 W. Va. 702, 90 S. E. 233.
Cf. Corn Exchange Bank v. Rockwell, (1895) 58 Ill. App. 506.39Frowert v. Blank, (1903) 205 Pa. St. 299, 303, 54 Atl. 1000, quoting
from Beach, Receivers, sec. 261.40Cf. handling of this problem in bankruptcy. Liens which may be
avoided under the act: 30 Stat. at L., 564 (1898) sec. 12 c. and f.; 36 Stat.
at L. 842 (1910) ; 11 U. S. C. A., sec. 107, c. and f.
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In state courts ancillary administration despite its disadvan-
tages is often very essential and practical. Full faith and credit
have not yet been extended to the foreign injunction.4' Nor
would such a decree bind persons who are beyond the jurisdiction
of the court when it is pronounced. If local assets are to be pre-
served from the ravages of forced sales, business is to be reor-
ganized, or property is to be disposed of to best advantage, there
are times when the active assistance of the court of the situs
must be sought. Its injunctions, proceedings in contempt, or
actual grants of special power are necessary in many instances
regardless of delay and expense.
It does not follow, however, that the analogy of this situation
is either appropriate or desirable when applied to the federal
courts. The distinction lies in the single sovereignty of the cen-
tral government. Its jurisdiction is nation-wide and its power,
commensurate. Here, then, is ideal ground for receivership ad-
ministration. But conditions are about as intolerable in its courts
as they are in those of the states, for neither its legislature nor
judges have taken full advantage of the political theory on which
the country was founded. In one instance, however, Congress has
improvised a definite improvement. Where "land or other prop-
erty of a fixed character" extends as a unit into different districts
in the same state, or into different states within the same federal
circuit, the jurisdiction of the federal court has been increased
accordingly.42 This decreases the number of ancillary bills which
must be filed. An expansion of such a plan to embrace the entire
country and all types of receiverships, as was once actively spon-
sored by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,4"
would render simple indeed the problem of actions by a federal
receiver.
THE DOCTRINE OF THE STATE COURTS
State courts are in general agreement with the rule of Booth
• "See: Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, (1930) 43 Harv. L.
Rev. 1217, 1239-1248: Comment, (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 719.
4236 Stat. at L. 1102 (1911) Jud. Code, sec. 55, 28 U. S. C. A. sec.
116; 36 Stat. at L. 1102 (1911) ; Jud. Code, sec. 56, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 117.
Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, (1922) 262 U. S. 77, 43 Sup. Ct.
480, 67 L. Ed. 871; Primos Chemical Co. v. Fulton Steel Corp., (D.C. N.Y.
1918) 254 Fed. 454. For the case which induced this change see Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (1896) 72 Fed. 26.43Annual Report of Special Committee on Equity Receiverships, (1927)
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N. Y. 299-331; Hearing before Comm.
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on Equity Receiverships,
(H.R. 9999, 10,000) April 11, 1930. See infra note no. 98.
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v. Clark as far as it denies the right of suit to a foreign equity
receiver." They differ from it, however, in extending a privi-
lege of suing whenever to do so will infringe upon neither state
policy nor the interests of local creditors.4 ' This consideration,
based upon comity, is sometimes expressed as an exception to the
strict federal interdiction-but an exception as firmly entrenched
as is the rule itself."6 An argument of convenience is offered in
its support . 7 As an expedient this hybrid comity serves its pur-
pose well. It circumvents the strictness of the federal dogma
without sacrificing the financial advantages reserved for citizens
44Boulware v. Davis, (1889) 90 Ala. 207, 8 So. 84; Stockbridge v.
Bechwith, (1887) 6 Del. Ch. 72, 33 Atl. 6-20; Richardson v. So. Fla. Mtg.
Co., (1931) 102 Fla. 313, 136 So. 393; Oliver v. Bullock, (1922) 28 Ga. App.
446, 111 S. E. 680; Reed v. Hollingsworth, (1912) 157 Iowa 94, 135 N. W.
37; Kronberg v. Elden, (1877) 18 Kan. 150; Castleman v. Templenan,(1898) 87 Md. 546, 40 Atl. 275; Homer v. Barr Pumping Engine Co.,
(1901) 180 Mass. 163, 61 N. E. 883; Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co. v.
Needles, (1873) 52 Mo. 17; Bodge v. Skinner Packing Co., (1926) 115
Neb. 41, 21 N. W. 203; Battle v. Davis, (1872) 66 N. C. 179; Mosbey v.
Burrow, (1880) 52 Tex. 386; Malone v. Johnson, (1907) 45 Tex. Civ. App.
604, 101 S. W. 503; Moreau v. Du Bellet, (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) 27 S. W.
503; Kind v. Cochran, (1900) 72 Vt. 107, 47 Atl. 394; Murtey v. Allen,
(1899) 71 Vt. 377, 45 At. 752; Filkins v. Nunnemacher, (1892) 81 Wis.
91, 51 N. W. 79.
45Rogers v. Haines, (1893) 96 Ala. 586, 11 So. 651; Boulware v.
Davis, (1889) 90 Ala. 207, 8 So. 84; Choctaw C. & M. Co. v. Williams-
Echols Dry Goods Co., (1905) 75 Ark. 365, 87 S. \V. 632; Stockbridge v.
Bechwith, (1887) 6 Del. Ch. 72, 33 Atd. 620; Barley v. Gittings, (1899)
15 App. D. C. 427; Richardson v. So. Fla. Mtg. Co., (1931) 102 Fla. 313,
136 So. 393; Patterson v. Lunde, (1885) 112 Ill. 196; Metzner v. Bauer,
(1884) 98 Ind. 425; Malone v. Averill, (1914) 166 Iowa 78, 147 N. W.
135; Rogers v. Rainis, (1896) 100 Ky. 295, 38 S. W. 483; Standard Oil Co.
v. Sugar Products Co., (1926) 160 La. 763, 107 So. 566; Hunt v. Columbian
Ins. Co., (1867) 55 Me. 290; Castleman v. Templeman, (1898) 87 Md.
546, 40 AtI. 275; Woodward v. Sonnesyn, (1925) 162 Minn. 397, 203
N. IV. 221; State ex rel v. Denton, (1910) 229 Mo. 187, 129 S. W. 709;
Hurd v. Elizabeth, (1897) 41 N. J. L. 1, 2 Atl. 453; Mabon v. The Onley
Electric Co., (1898) 156 N. Y. 196, 50 N. E. 805; Van Kempen v. Latham,(1928) 195 N. C. 389, 142 S. E. 322; State ex rel. v. Crabbe, (1926) 114
Ohio St. 504, 151 N. E. 755; Egan v. N. A. Loan Co., (1904) 45 Or. 131,
76 Pac. 774; Solis v. Blank, (1901) 199 Pa. St. 600, 49 Atl. 302; Hazlett
v. Woodhead, (1907) 28 R. I. 452, 67 Atl. 736; Wilson v. Keels, (1899)
54 S. C. 545, 32 S. E. 702; Cole v. Sassenberry, (1930) 56 S. D. 595, 230
N. W. 22; Hardee v. Wilson, (1914) 129 Tenn. 511, 167 S. XV. 475; Swing
v. Bentley & Gerwig F. Co., (1898) 45 W. Va. 283, 31 S. E. 295; Continental
Oil Co. v. Am. Coop. Ass'n, (1924) 31 Wyo. 433, 228 Pac. 503.
46Alderson, Receivers, sec. 551; also cases cited in note no. 45, supra.
Laughlin, The Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers, (1932) 45 Harv. L
Rev. 429, 435 et seq.47
"When the claims of a foreign receiver are brought into conflict
with those of our own citizens, the latter will have the preference, because
it is hardly just, and certainly not expedient, to remit them to a distantjurisdiction for what is close at hand and can be obtained at home." Smith
v. Electric Machinery Co., (1924) 83 Pa. Super. Ct 143, 145.
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of the forum. Their attachments, although subsequent in time to
the foreign receivership and with notice of it, will be respected."
It is only necessary for a defendant to show the presence of home
creditors,4" whereupon the receiver is thrown out of court and is
referred to the precarious device, extra expense and delay of
securing ancillary papers.
Despite the development in the state courts of the doctrine
that a transfer by operation of statute has no extraterritorial ef-
fect, these tribunals follow the federal decisions and agree that a
receiver who is also a common-law assignee, 50 a statutory succes-
sor to a corporation,5 1 a statutory assignee,12 or a quasi assignee"8
may sue in other jurisdictions. Comity is no longer the basis for
his access to foreign courts.5 4  Similarly they utilize contract
"81Lackmann v. S. C. 0. C. F., (1904) 142 Cal. 22, 75 Pac. 583; Dunlop
v. Paterson Fire Ins. Co., (1878) 12 Hun (N.Y.) 627; Kruger v. Bank,
(1898) 123 N. C. 16, 31 S. E. 270; Smith v. Fidelity B. L. & I. A., (1895)
4 Pa. Dist. 317. See: Clark v. S. C. 0. C. F., (1905) 146 Cal. 598, 80
Pac. 931. Also cases cited supra note no. 45. However, such liens may
be taken into account if the creditor files his claim in the primary receiver-
ship. Ward v. Connecticut Pipe Mfg. Co., (1899) 71 Conn. 345, 41 At. 1057.4
°Richardson v. So. Fla. Mtg. Co., (1931) 102 Fla. 313, 136 So. 393;
Stevens v. Tilden, (1913) 122 Minn. 250, 142 N. W. 315; Boulware v. Davis,
(1889) 90 Ala. 207, 8 So. 84; cf. Hieronymous Bros. v. China Mut. Ins.
Co., (1919) 6 Ala. App. 97, 60 So. 452. See: Flaacke v. Winona Mills Co.,(1926) 104 Conn. 665, 134 Att. 265. If the foreign receivership was prose-
cuted in behalf of a citizen of the forum, injury to other citizens is not a
bar. Folk v. Janes, (1892) 49 N. J. Eq. 484, 23 Atl. 813.50
"If the title is by virtue of a voluntary conveyance or transfer, it is
sustained as against all, including even domestic creditors." Howarth v.
Angle, (1900) 162 N. Y. 179, 186, 56 N. E. 489, 492. Ace: Hale v.
Harris, (1900) 112 Iowa 372, 83 N. W. 1046; Ewing v. King, (1896) 169
Mass. 97, 47 N. E. 597; Harris v. Hibbard, (N.J. Eq. 1908) 71 Ati. 737.5
'Bokover v. Life Ass'n of America, (1883) 77 Va. 85. See Taylor
v. Columbian Ins. Co., (1867) 14 Allen (Mass.) 353.
52Cooney Co. v. Arlington Hotel Co., (1917) 11 Del. Ch. 286, 101
Ati. 879; Buswell v. Order of the Iron Hall, (1894) 161 Mass. 224;
Barclay v. The Quicksilver Mining Co., (1872) 6 Lans. (N.Y.) 25;
Ardmore Nat'l Bank v. Briggs Machinery & Supply Co., (1908) 20 Okla.
427, 94 Pac. 533; Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright, (1883) 55 Vt. 524.
53J. W. Cooney v. Arlington Hotel Co., (1917) 11 Del. Ch. Rep. 286,
101 Atl. 879; Bullock v. Oliver, (1923) 155 Ga. 151, 116 S. E. 293; Hirn-
ing v. Hamlin, (1925) 200 Iowa 1322, 206 N. W. 617; Childs v. Cleaves,
(1901) 95 Me. 498, 50 Atl. 714; Howarth v. Lombard, (1900) 175 Mass.
570, 56 N. E. 888; Shipman v. Treadwell, (1913) 208 N. Y. 404, 102 N. E.
623. Hardee v. Wilson, (1914) 129 Tenn. 511, 167 S. W. 475; King v.
Cochran, (1901) 76 Vt. 141, 56 AtI. 667; Parker v. Stoughton Mill Co.,
(1895) 91 Wis. 174, 64 N. W. 751. See Union Guardian Tr. Co. v. Bdwy.
Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., (1930) 138 Misc. Rep. 16, 245 N. Y. S. 2.541n Missouri the rule of comity is replaced by a statutory right to
sue: Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1919, sec. 1162. "There is nothing in these con-
tentions even if it had been shown that the Mineral Belt Bank had a
creditor in Missouri, which was not. Since the passage of sections 1162,
1163, and 1164, Revised Statutes 1919, the question of comity, within the
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theories to support assessments against foreign stockholders," or
to secure an equal distribution of assets of a foreign insurance
corporation.16  An appointing court may avoid the jeopardy of
local comity by forcing the debtor to assign, and feel assured that
as long as local creditors are not involved, the title, although trans-
ferred under coercion, will be respected abroad.17 But beyond
this point the efficacy of the title device is questionable."6 At the
instance of resident claimants some courts will refuse to recog-
nize even voluntary foreign assignments."9 And if an assignment
is statutory, even though it may be no more in invitum than when
a debtor executes a deed under compulsion, a court may raise the
distinction between voluntary transfers by act of party and those
by operation of law. 60
A cofisistent adherence to the theory of territorial limitations
would probably result in granting the privilege of attaclunent to
residents of third states. But limitations placed on the ability of a
court of primary jurisdiction, and the denial of mobilia sequuntur
personam are merely expedients. When local preference is not
broad meaning of the word, and in a transitory cause of action of this kind,
is no longer material in this state. . . . This state in this suit is not
concerned with the distribution of the proceeds of the causes of action.
(Sections 1164 and 1165, R-S. 1919)." State ex rel. v. National City
Bank, (1925) 22 Mo. App. 474, 480, 274 S. W. 945, 949.55Howarth v. Lombard, (1900) 175 Mass. 570, 56 N. E. 888; Howarth
v. Angle, (1899) 39 App. Div. 151, 57 N. Y. S. 187, aff. Hoarth v. Angle,(1900) 162 N. Y. 179, 56 N. E. 489; Cushing v. Perot, (1896) 175 Pa. St.
66, 34 Atl. 447. Cf. In re Queensland Mercantile & Agency Co., [1890]
1 Ch. 536, 60 L. J. Ch. 579.
56 Mfartyne v. Am. Union Fire Ins. Co., (1915) 216 N. Y. 183, 110
N. E. 502; Bockover v. Life Ass'n of America, (1883) 77 Va. 85. Contra,
Schloss v. Metropolitan Surety Co., (1910) 149 Iowa 382, 128 N. \W. 384.57Gilliland v. Inabnlit, (1894) 92 Iowa 46, 60 N. IV. 211; Graydon v.
Church, (1859) 7 Mich. 36, 59 N. WV. 432; Deschenes v. Tallman, (1928)
248 N. Y. 33, 161 N. E. 321; WVeller v. J. B. Pace Tobacco Co.. (1888) 2
N. Y. Sup. Ct 292; Morris v. Hand, (1899) 70 Tex. 481, 8 S. \V. 210;
Wharton, Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., p. 651. See: Tardy v. Morgan, (C.C.
Ind. 1844) 3 McLean 358, Fed. Cas. No. 13,752. See American Law In-
stitute, Conflict of Laws Restatement, sec. 102.5sSee similar treatment in re federal courts, supra pp. 712-14.59Supra note no. 5. See, Catlin v. The Wilcox Silver-Plate Co.,(1889) 123 Ind. 477, 24 N. E. 250; Union Guardian Tr. Co. v. Bdwy. Nat'l
Bk. & Tr. Co., (1930) 138 Misc. Rep. 16, 245 N. Y. S. 2, 8; Deschenes V.
Tallman, (1928) 248 N. Y. 33, 161 N. E. 321.60Gray v. Covert, (1900) 25 Ind. App. 561. 58 N. E. 731; Schloss v.
Surety Co., (1910) 149 Iowa 382, 128 N. V. 384; Zacker v. Fidelity T. &
S. V. Co., (1900) 109 Ky. 441, 59 N. W. 493; Lichenstein Bros. & Co.
v. Gillett Bros., (1885) 37 La. Ann. 522; Howarth v. Angle, (1900) 162
N. Y. 179, 56 N. E. 489; Warren Ross Lumber Co. v. Haniel Clark & Son.
Inc., (1925) 211 App. Div. 591, 207 N. Y. S. 391; Bank v. Motherwell, etc.,
Co., (1895) 95 Tenn. 172, 31 S. W. 1003; Mosely v. Burrow, (1880) 53 Tex.
396.
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the issue, courts disagree as to whether the receiver or the at-
taching creditor should be protected. Usually residents of the
appointing state are held to be bound by their personal law."'
Some courts place citizens of third states on a parity with those
of the forum. 2 The general language of the decisions supports
the receivership in all instances save where interests of local
creditors are concerned. 3
When the attaching creditor is from the appointing state, its
courts are not without remedy even if those of the situs refuse
to recognize the receivership. If he has property within the state,
or if his person can be seized there, an injunction or a citation for
contempt may be effective.64  These injunctions are sometimes
respected at the situs. 5 And if the creditor, whether he is local
or foreign, is shown to have accepted the benefits of a receiver-
6
"Fisher v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1916) 112 Miss. 30, 72 So.
846; Bank v. McLeod, (1882) 38 Ohio St. 174; Bagby v. A. M. & 0. R. R.
Co., (1878) 86 Pa. St. 291; Gilman v. Ketcham, (1893) 84 Wis. 60, 54
N. W. 395. See: Brown v. Tishomingo Banking Co., (1917) 200 Ala. 613,
76 Ati. 971; Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Burns, (1915) 17 Ga. App. 1, 86 S. E.
270; Linville v. Hadden & Co., (1898) 88 Md. 594, 41 Atl. 1097; Receiver
of the State Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, (1881) 34 N. J. Eq. 450. Cf: The
S. C. R. Co. v. Peoples' Say. Co., (1887) 64 Ga. 18; Bank v. Motherwell
Iron, etc., Co., (1895) 95 Tenn. 172, 31 S. W. 1003; Solis v. Blank, (1901)
199 Pa. St. 600, 49 Atl. 302.
62Stockbridge v. Beckwith, (1887) 6 Del. Ch. 72, 33 Atd. 620; Sea-
board Airline Ry. v. Burns, (1915) 15 Ga. App. 1, 86 S. F. 270, Catlin v.
Wilcox Silver-Plate Co., (1889) 123 Ind. 477, 24 N. E. 250; Liehtenseein
Bros. & Co. v. Gillett Bros., (1885) 37 La. Ann. 522; Linville v. Hadden &
Co., (1898) 88 Md. 594, 41 At. 1097; John Ray Clark Co. v. Toby Valley
Supply Co., (1893) 3 Pa. Dist. 518; Warren v. The Union Nat'l Bank,(1869) 7 Phila. (Pa.) 156. Contra: Perkins, Goodwin & Co. v. The
Clear Springs Paper Co., (1885) 17 Phila. (Pa.) 168. See: Matter of
People (City Eq. Fire Ins. Co.) (1924) 238 N. Y. 147, 144 N. E. 484:
Hardee v. Wilson, (1914) 129 Tenn. 511, 516, 167 S. W. 475, 476.
'3"In our opinion the application of the rule in favor of the foreign
receiver as against all foreign creditors, without regard to whether they
have a common domicile with the receiver, is true comity." Weil v. Bank,(1898) 76 Mo. App. 34. Cf: assignment cases supra pp. 707-08.
64Cole v. Cunningham, (1889) 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33
L. Ed. 538; Stewart v. Laberree, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1911) 185 Fed. 471;
Receivers Middlesex Banking Co. v. Realty Inv. Co., (1926) 104 Conn.
206, 132 Atl. 390; Holbrook v. Ford, (1894) 153 111. 633, 39 N. E. 1091;
Secomb v. Catlin, (1889) 128 Ill. 556, 21 N. W. 606; C. & 0. R. R. Co. v.
Swayze, (1901) 60 N. J. Eq. 417, 47 Atd. 28: In re Besuden Co., (1896) 5
Oh. Dec. 565; Chaffee v. Quidnick Co., (1881) 13 R. I. 442; The V. & C.
R. R. Co. v. The V. C. R. R. Co., (1873) 46 Vt. 792. See: Reynolds v.
Adden, (1889) 136 U. S. 348, 10 Sup. Ct. 843, 34 L. Ed. 360; Barton v.
Barbour, (1881) 104 U. S. 126, 128, 26 L. Ed. 672.
65Fisher v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1916) 112 Miss. 30, 72 So.
846; Denver City Waterworks Co. v. American Waterworks Co., (1913)
81 N. J. Eq. 139, 85 Atl. 826; Gilman v. Ketcham, (1893) 84 Wis. 60,
54 N. W. 395. Cf. The S. C. R. Co. v. Peoples' Say. Co., (1887) 64 Ga
18. Cf. supra note no. 41.
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ship, this conduct is sufficient to forfeit his privilege of local at-
tachment.6
That the decree of an equity court cannot directly affect
foreign land is clearly settled, both in state and in federal courtsY
It might seem then that an order instructing a receiver to take
possession of a debtor's property would have no bearing on foreign
realty. Certainly under our territorial theory of law the court
of the situs would not be bound to recognize such a decree of a
sister state. As far as the management of realty is concerned
authority must come through an ancillary receivership." State
courts, however, are not always as meticulous regarding actions
which concern foreign insolvent's interest in local land. While
it may be more difficult to rationalize a jurisdictional argument in
such cases than where personal property is involved, legal theory
is appeased by recourse to the principle of comity.G9 If a re-
ceiver's claim is based upon an assignment,"0 either by act of the
party or by statute, the law of that subject should be consulted."
"6DeMattos v. Camp & Hinton Co., (1911) 129 Ga. 251, 55 So. 832;
Wilson v. Keels, (1899) 54 S. C. 545, 32 S. E. 702; Continental Oil Co.
v. Am. Coop. Ass'n, (1924) 31 Wyo. 433, 228 Pac. 503; cf: Lucey Mfg.
Corp. v. Morlan, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1926) 14 F. (2d) 920; Morlan v.
Lucey Mfg. Co., (D.C. Cal. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 494; Schendelholz v Cullum,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1893) 55 Fed. 885; Davis v. Morgan Foundry Co., (1930)
224 Mo. App. 162, 23 S. W. (2d) 231.6 7Massie v. Watts, (1810) 6 Cranch (U. S.) 148, 3 L. Ed. 181;
Hart v. Samson, (1884) 110 U. S. 151, 3 Sup. Ct. 586, 28 L. Ed. 101;
Carpenter v. Strange, (1891) 141 .U. S. 87, 11 Sup. Ct. 960, 35 L. Ed.
640; Winn v. Strickland, (1894) 34 Fla. 610, 16 So. 606; Rogers v.
Rogers, (1896) 56 Kan. 483, 43 Pac. 779; Graydon v. Church, (1859) 7
Mich. 36, 59 N. W. 432; Davis v. Headley, (1871) 22 N. J. Eq. 115;
Simpkins v. Smith & Parmelee Gold Co., (1875) 50 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 56;
Gibson & Wife v. Burgess, (1886) 82 Va. 651. See: Cook, The Powers of
Courts of Equity, (1915) 15 Col. L. Rev. 37, 106, 228; Barbour, Extra-
territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree, (1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 527;
Goodrich, Enforcement of a Foreign Equitable Decree, (1920) 5 Iowa
L. B. 230; Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to
Equitable Decrees for the Conveyance of Foreign Land, (1925) 34 Yale
L. J. 591.6 8Primos Chemical Co. v. Fulton Steel Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1918) 254
Fed. 454, 463, citing 4 Pomeroy, 4th ed., sec. 1438.
69Hallam v. Ashford, (1902) 24 Ky. L. R. 870, 70 S. W\. 197; The Nat'l
Tr. Co. v. Murphy, (1879) 30 N. J. Eq. 408; Runk v. St. John, (1859)
29 Barb. (N.Y.) 585; Small v. Smith, (1901) 14 S. D. 621, 86 N. \V. 649.
See Richardson v. So. Fla. Mtg. Co., (1931) 102 Fla. 313, 136 So. 393.
7 0Harris v. Hibbard, (N.J. Eq. 1908) 71 Atl. 737; Graydon Y. Church,
(1859) 7 Mich. 36, 59 N. W. 432; Clark v. Olson, (1900) 9 N. D. 364,
83 N. W. 519; joy v. Midland St. Bank, (1910) 26 S. D. 244, 128 N. W. 147.
7
'Supra notes nos. 1-9. In the absence of statute the validity of a
deed is determined by the law of the situs: United States v. Crosby. (1812)
7 Cranch (U.S.) 115, 3 L. Ed. 287; Moore v. Church, (1886) 70 Iowa
208, 30 N. W. 855; Green v. Gross, (1881) 12 Neb. 117, 10 N. W. 459.
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As distinguished from receiving an assignment, a receiver
may have obtained a conveyance or a mortgage of foreign land,7 2
entered into a contract,73 reduced a claim to judgment,"' or taken
actual possession of personalty which he later sold or sent into a
foreign jurisdiction.7 5  In such instances his legal interests are
uniformly upheld in both state and federal courts. He is con-
sidered as having a claim in his own right as compared with one
conferred by the mere order of an appointing court. Whether
or not this is a sufficient distinction upon which to base the recog-
nition of a foreign receiver is immaterial. The important thing
is that the courts have not carried their favoring of local creditors
quite so far as to make the operation of receiverships completely
ineffective when they reach across state lines.
Lorenzen, The Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Regards Form
in the Conflict of Laws, (1911) 20 Yale L. J. 427, 431. American Law
Institute, Conflict of Laws Restatement, secs. 236, 237, 239. That a
statutory assignment is not a panacea: "A foreign receiver, or a foreign
assignee whose office and power are statutory, and to whom no voluntary
conveyance has been made, cannot effectively convey real estate in Illinois.
nor can he obtain the assistance of the courts of Illinois to secure the
possession of chattels in this jurisdiction." Smith v. Berz, (1905) 125 Il1.
App. 122, 130.72Oliver v. Clark, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1901) 106 Fed. 402; Iglehart v.
Bierce, (1864) 36 I1. 133.73Chi. B. & S. v. -United States, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1919) 261 Fed. 266;
Interstate T. & B. Co. v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., (1908) 133 Mo. App.
35. 113 S. W. 1; Ten Broek v. Caldwell, (1914) 95 Neb. 464, 145 N. W.
980; Moore v. Schmidt, (1915) 60 Pa. Super. 422. See LeFevre v. Matthews,
(1899) 39 App. Div. 232, 57 N. Y. S. 128.
74McBride v. Oriental Bk., (D.C. N.Y. 1912) 200 Fed. 895; Wilkinson
v. Culver, (C.C. N.Y. 1885) 25 Fed. 639.
75The Williamette Valley, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. (1895) 66 Fed. 565;
Cooke v. Town of Orange, (1880) 48 Conn. 401; Pond v. Cooke. (1877)
45 Conn. 126; Blake Crusher Co. v. New Haven, (1878) 46 Conn. 473;
Jenkins v. Purcell, (1907) 29 App. D. C. 209; C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v.
Packet Co., (1884) 108 Ill. 317; McAlpin v. Jones, (1885) 10 La. Ann.
552; Paradise v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, (1850) 5 La. Ann. 710:
Robertson v. Stead, (1896) 135 Mo. 135, 36 S. W. 610; The Merchants'
Nat'l Bank v. Penna. Steel Co., (1894) 57 N. J. L. 336, 30 At. 545;
Guillander v. Howell, (1866) 35 N. Y. 657; Woodhull v. Farmers' Tr.
Co., (1903) 11 N. D. 157, 90 N. W. 795; Somerset Coal Co. v. Diamond
State Steel Co., (1909) 224 Pa. St. 217, 73 At. 442; Lett v. Thuber Why-
land Co., (1895) 4 Pa. Dist. 239; Cagill v. Woolridge, (1876) 8 Bax.
(Tenn.) 580. Contra: Humphreys v. Hopkins. (1889) 81 Cal. 551, 22
Pac. 892. Cf: Wilkinson v. Harding Dredging Co., (1916) 186 S. W. 743.
This also applies to personalty within the jurisdiction of the forum, which
a foreign receiver reduces to his possession without court aid; Sands
v. Greeley & Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1898) 88 Fed. 130; The Williamette
Valley, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1895) 66 Fed. 565; Boyles v. Royal Canner Mfg.
Co., (1920) 216 Ill. App. 576; Frowert v. Blank, (1903) 205 Pa. St. 299, 54
Atl. 1000. As to the situs of pledged securities see: Guaranty Trust Co.
of New York v. Fentress, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 329, noted in
(1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 1441.
EXTRA TERRITORIAL ACTIONS BY RECEII'ERS
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
Since law deals with legal relations rather than with things,
the fact that tangibles have actual locations while intangibles have
only those which are arbitrarily assigned to them does not sub-
stantially affect the power of an appointing court to transfer an
insolvent's interest in a foreign chattel or a debt. In either case
the law of the situs of tangibles or that which governs a debtor's
conduct controls.76  It is to this law that we must look for comity.
But the assignment cases7 7 show that little can be expected at
present in the way of uniform recognition of a foreign receiver's
powers, whether the method of evasion is by refusing the privi-
lege of suii or by denying extraterritorial effect to decrees of a
sister court.-, The basis of the difficulty lies not in the problem
of selecting the proper law, 7 nor in any fundamental distinction
between matters of substance and of procedure, 0 but in the preva-
lent assumption by American courts that best ends are served by
protecting local creditors at the expense of foreign ones.
This policy makes no attempt to distinguish among the various
purposes for which a receiver may be appointed. To this extent
at least there is no discrimination. Nor should there be. When
the proceeding in the foreign court is in aid of execution instead
of for the altruistic purpose of benefiting all creditors, the eco-
nomic contest is most pronounced. Yet it is submitted that here,
too, comity should be extended. If a litigant is unsuccessful in
satisfying a judgment which he has legally obtained, citation of
76Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 362-364 discusses this subject from the
standpoint of assignments. See Gilbert v. Herveston. (1900) 79 Minn.
326, 82 N. W. 655.77Supra note no. 5.7
81t is sometimes difficult to determine whether local creditors are
being protected by refusing a foreign receiver permission to sue or by
denying extraterritorial effect to rights regarding property interests created
by the appointing court. See discussion in case note, 4 L. R. A. (N.S.) 824.79For theories regarding "proper law" see: Cook. The Logical and
Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 457 and Recogni-
tion of "Massachusetts Rights" by New York Courts, (1918) 28 Yale L. J.
67; Lorenzen, Validity and Effect of Contracts in Conflict of Laws, (1921)
30 Yale L. J. 655, 661; Strumberg, Conflict of Laws. Foreign Created
Rights, (1930) 8 Texas L. Rev. 173. Cf: Goodrich. Tort Obligations and
the Conflict of Laws, (1924) 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 19; Sloovere, The Local
Law Theory and its Implications in the Conflict of Laws, (1928) 41
Harv. L. Rev. 421. That a debtor may thus be forced to pay twice does
not seem to embarrass the courts. Osgood v. Maguire, (1875) 61 N. Y.
524, 529.80
°ee Arnold: The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the
Legal Process, (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 617; Cook. "Substance" and
"Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 333.
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authority is scarcely necessary to show that he may demand
"full faith and credit" for it in another state. But of what avail
is this recognition if a non-resident is denied the use of local
enforcement machinery?81 Whether he sues in his own name or
through the medium of a foreign receiver, his resourcefulness
should entitle him to the privilege of attaching local property.
Home creditors should protect their interests by a similar action
or by a timely recourse to bankruptcy. 2 That a non-resident
thereby gains a preference is immaterial. An attachment is not
intended as an instrument for securing equality. Attainment of
that virtue lies in making the device indiscriminately available.
Retortion is the net result of the present policy.
Solicitude for the welfare of home creditors is also an alleged
factor in the policy of discretionary remission of assets to a
primary receiver. Courts hesitate to subject their citizens to the
inconvenience of appealing to a foreign court where for aught is
known they will be unfairly treated."2  Hence local dividends
should be distributed before any funds are remitted.8 '
Yet the existence of a threatened discrimination does not seem
to be a condition precedent to a refusal to remit ;8 nor does the ar-
s5Attachment statutes sometimes discriminate against the non-resident.
"But what property may be removed from a state and subjected to the
claims of creditors of other states, is a matter of comity between nations
and states and not a matter of absolute right in favor of creditors of
another sovereignty, when citizens of the local state or county are asserting
rights against property within the local jurisdiction." Disconto Geselischaft
v. Umbreit, (1908) 209 U. S. 570, 578, 28 Sup. Ct. 337, 52 L. Ed. 625.
See Hazard v. Jordan, (1847) 12 Ala. 180; Hemingway v. Moore, (1847)
11 Ala. 645; Matter of Marty, (1848) 3 Barb. (N.Y.) 229; Matter of
Brown, (1839) 21 Wend. (N.Y.) 316; Matter of Fitch, (1829) 2 Wend.(N.Y.) 299; Ex parte Schroeder, (1827) 6 Cow. (N.Y.) 603; Oliver v.
Walter Heywood Chair Mfg. Co., (1890) 10 N. Y. S. 771; Bridges v.
Wade, (1906) 113 App. Div. 350, 99 N. Y. S. 126; McCrady v. Kline,
(1846) 28 N. C. 245; Taylor v. Buckley, (1845) 27 N. C. 384; Broghill v.
Wellborn, (1834) 15 N. C. 511; Decatur Bank v. Berry, (1842) 3 Humphr.
(Tenn.) 590; Webb v. Lee, (1834) 6 Yerg (Tenn.) 472; Shurgart v. Orr;
(1833) 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 191; Kincaid v. Francis, (1812) Cooke (Tenn.)
49; Hills v. Lazelle, (1858) 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 363; Taylor v. Badoux, (1893)
92 Tenn. 249, 21 S. W. 552; Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Motherwell Iron
etc. Co., (1895) 95 Tenn. 172, 31 S. W. 1003; Douglas v. Bank of Com-
merce, (1896) 97 Tenn. 133, 36 S. W. 874.
8230 Stat. at L. 546 (1898), 32 Stat. at L. 797 (1903), 44 Stat. at
L. 662 (1926), 11 U. S. C. A., sec. 21.
s3Webster v. Judah, (1888) 27 II. App. 294, 298.84Supra note no. 38. But see: Clark v. Painted Post Lumber Co.,
(1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 409, 104 Ati. 728; cf. Bank Commissioners v. Granite
State Provident Ass'n, (1900) 70 N. H. 557, 49 Att. 124.
"
5Witness the following language: "The question is one of far reach-
ing importance. In the instant case, the domicil of the corporation is in
New York, and the policy of its law is similar to that of ours with respect
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gument of inconvenience bulk as large today as it once did. In fact,
the personal convenience of a creditor living near a state or district
line may well induce him to file his claim with a domiciliary re-
ceiver in a contiguous jurisdiction, rather than to participate in an
ancillary proceeding at some distant point within the state or local
district. Possibly hypothetical inconvenience and skepticism re-
garding the justice which may be meted out by courts of sister
states or districts are relatively minor motives when compared
with the astuteness of courts in recognizing the claims of local
creditors and in protecting their attachments."0
Nor is logic as convincing a medium for rationalizing a denial
of suit to a foreign equity receiver as is our knowledge of this
inherent protective urge.8 7  Yet the short-sightedness of such a
to a ratable distribution among creditors. But it is not beyond the range
of possibility that in some of the other states there may be laws with re-
spect to priorities quite opposed to the policy of our law, and it seems to
me to be inconceivable that this court, having control of assets within this
state, would remit its citizens to a foreign tribunal, which might have
control only of the entity of the corporation, and compel them to submit
themselves to a method of distribution in conflict with the policy of this
state under laws having no extraterritorial force. Comity does not extend
so far .... If domestic creditors must be forced to litigate in New York,
they must also be forced to litigate in Texas; and it may be contended that
the effect of such a determination does not stop here." Clark v. Painted
Post Lumber Co., (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 409, 104 Atl. 728, 730. Cf: Superior
Cabinet Corp. v. American Piano Co., (D.C. Mass. 1930) 39 F. (2d)
87. See (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 767.
s6Of local assets are large enough so that dividends to which home
creditors are entitled may be paid out of them without participation in the
primary receivership, economy, convenience and equality may be served
best through ancillary proceedings. It rests with the discretion of the ap-
pointing court whether or not it will remit assets. Sands v. Greeley & Co.,
(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1898) 88 Fed. 130 citing -United States v. Coxe, (1855)
18 How. (U.S.) 100, 105, 15 L. Ed. 299, and cases supra note no. 38.
Cf. suggested method in federal cases, infra note no. 100.87E.g.: "The question naturally first arises whether such an officer
[foreign receiver] has any power which he can exercise in Wisconsin.
Certainly the Illinois court could not transfer to this receiver any property
outside of its territorial jurisdiction. . . . This conclusion is founded on
reason and sound policy. The reason plainly is that a court cannot endow
its officials with powers beyond its own jurisdiction. The stream cannot
rise higher than the fountain-head. Therefore, by his appointment in
Illinois, the plaintiff acquired absolutely no right or interest in any property
owned by Frederiksen in Wisconsin. If he acquired no right can he bring a
suit here to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance of property by
Frederiksen? Suppose he is successful in such a suit, we should have this
remarkable anomaly: that, although this receiver cannot come to Wiscon-
sin and take Frederiksen's property, still he can come here and prosecute
an action against a third person, and show that such third person has no
title to property as against Frederiksen's creditors, and triumphantly bear
away ,tch property to Illinois to pay creditors. The law does not tolerate
such an absurdity. The fact simply is that the order appointing a receiver
confers no extraterritorial rights either to property or to maintain actions
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policy must be manifest. The insolvency of a concern which has
assets situated in more than one state or district is not a matter
for territorial insulation. A business and its attendant assets
should constitute a unit, and creditors who have not protected
themselves by obtaining liens s should compose a single class re-
gardless of residence."9
Some light may be thrown upon the subject by considering the
policies which accompany the ancillary administration of dece-
dents' insolvent estates"0 or of receiverships. The following ex-
cerpt from a West Virginia receivership case is in point:
"It is conceded that we have no statute giving to local or resi-
dent creditors priority or preference in the distribution of the
assets of a foreign corporation located here; but it is argued that
we have a public policy to that effect ...and which the courts
are bound to enforce.
"We know of no public policy of this state evidenced by
statute or judicial decisions going to the extent affirmed by counsel.
We do have chapter 84 of the Code. .. and we have decisions...
to the effect that foreign receivers will not be allowed to remove
to recover property." Filkins v. Nunnemacher, (1892) 81 Wis. 91, 93, 51
N. W. 79, 80.
8s"Insurance funds set apart in advance for the benefit of home policy
holders of a foreign insurance company doing business in the State are a
trust fund of a specific kind to be administered for the exclusive benefit
of certain persons." Blake v. McClung, (1898) 172 U. S. 239, 257, 19 Sup.
Ct. 165, 43 L. Ed. 432; State ex rel. v. Crabbe, (1926) 114 Ohio St. 504,
151 N. E. 755. See In re People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), (1926) 242
N. Y. 148, 151 N. E. 159; Frowert v. Blank, (1903) 205 Pa. St. 299, 54
Ati. 1000.
s
9 0ne federal court has declared against this practice in assignment
cases, but the cogency of its reasoning is doubtful, and the economics of its
decision seems to have borne no fruit. Belfast Savings Bank v. Stowe,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1899) 92 Fed. 100. Cf: In re J. L. Nelson & Bros. Co.
(D.C. N.Y. 1907) 149 Fed. 590.
9 0"Where ... the entire assets of the deceased are insufficient to pay
all his just obligations, there is such an interdependence between the
various jurisdictions as to require the application of the old maxim that
'equality is equity', and the several courts administering the affairs of
the deceased . . .must no longer consider the assets within their respective
controls as separate and distinct funds for distribution to the creditors within
such jurisdictions, but as one entire fund in which all creditors of the
deceased having just claims of equal standing shall share pro rata." Estate
of Hanreddy, (1922) 176 Wis. 570, 575, 576. 186 N. W. 744, 746. This
seems to be the general attitude in the administration of decedents' insol-
vent estates: Mitchell v. Cox, (1859) 28 Ga. 32: Ramsay v. Ramsay, (1902)
196 Ill. 179, 63 N. E. 618; Dawes v. Head, (1825) 20 Mass. 128; Lawrence
v. Elmendorf and Pool, (1848) 3 Barb. (N.Y.) 73; Tyler v. Thompson,
(1878) 44 Tex. 497. See Dow v. Lillie, (1914) 26 N. D. 512, 144 N..W.
1082. "The tendency of modern legislation in this last respect, which we
gather from local statutes, is by no means selfish; for it is yielding much
not to appropriate local assets to the prior satisfaction of local creditors."
Schouler on Wills, Executors and Administrators, 5th ed. sec. 1015a.
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assets of a foreign corporation to the detriment of resident per-
sons, or compel local creditors to go into a foreign jurisdiction to
collect their debts; but neither the statute nor the decisions evince
a public policy to contravene the provisions of the federal con-
stitution, by undertaking to give resident creditors as a class
priority and preference in the distribution of such assets, further
than to protect them in their right to be paid their equal and
ratable shares based on the total assets of the foreign corporation,
out of the assets in the hands of local representatives, without
having to go outside the state to collect their debts."'"
But why should such fairness be reserved for ancillary re-
ceiverships and not be extended to the foreign receiver who brings
an action abroad?92 This is not the case with a bankruptcy re-
ceiver. He may protect assets of the estate even though they are
located beyond the jurisdiction of the appointing court. 9  Must
equality of treatment among citizens be grounded solely upon
91Brunner v. York Bridge G., (1916) 78 W. Va. 702, 705, 90 S. E.
233. Also cases cited in note no. 38.921n answer to this seeming inconsistency the court in Catlin v. The
Wilcox Silver-Plate Co., (1889) 123 Ind. 477, 479, 24 N. E. 250 says:
"But the recognition of well-established principles of comity and courtesy
between courts of different jurisdictions is one thing, while the rights of
resident or other attaching creditors who are seeking to avail themselves
of legal proceedings authorized by statutes of the State for the appropria-
tion of a fund belonging to a resident debtor, must be determined upon al-
together different principles." For an extreme case of foresight in favor
of local creditors who had filed no claims see Hieronymous Bros. v. China
Mut. Ins. Co., (1919) 6 Ala. App. 97, 60 So. 452.93
"The authority of the bankruptcy court to appoint a receiver for the
preservation of the estate pending the adjudication, to authorize the re-
ceiver temporarily to conduct the business of the alleged bankrupt, and
to make all orders necessary for the accomplishment of those objects.
applies to the entire estate of the bankrupt, wheresoever it may be situated
in the United States, and is not confined to such property as may be
within the district wherein the petition in bankruptcy is filed. In short.
the authority to take precautions for the preservation of the estate pending
the adjudication in bankruptcy is quite as broad, territorially speaking, as is
the authority to collect, administer, and settle the estate after a trustee is
appointed. Section 2, clause 3 of the bankruptcy act.., authorizes the court
to appoint receivers 'for the preservation of estates, to take charge of the
property of bankrupts.' Wherever the estate is in the United States, there
this jurisdiction extends. In its exercise the court may authorize the receiver
to take possession of property belonging to the estate wherever situated, and
restrain third parties from pursuing remedies in other courts which will
conflict with the duties of the receiver." In re Dempster, (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1909) 172 Fed. 353, 356. See: In re Munice Pulp Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir.
1907) 151 Fed. 732; In re Peiser, (D.C. Pa. 1902) 115 Fed. 199. Cf: In re
Dunseath & Sons Co., (D.C. Pa. 1909) 168 Fed. 973; In re Benedict, (D.C.
Wis. 1905) 140 Fed. 55; In re Schrom, (D.C. Iowa 1899) 97 Fed. 760. As
to national jurisdiction in bankruptcy: 19th Stat. at L. 63 (1876), 12 U. S.
C. A., sec. 192. See Peters v. Foster, (1890) 56 Hun (N.Y.) 607, 10 N. Y.
S. 389. The jurisdiction of receivers in county courts may be state wide.
Tenth Nat'l Bank v. Construction Co., (1910) 227 Pa. St. 354, 76 Atd. 67;
1 Clark, Receivers, 2nd ed., sec. 294 (a).
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federal mandates? If it is correct to say that "the courts of one
state have no right to favor domestic creditors in the distribution,
but it must be made upon the principle that "equality is equity, ' '9 4
why should not the spirit of that maxim require a general appli-
cation of its letter without the necessity of a formal ancillary pro-
ceeding?
If it be argued that credit is extended today just as it once
was upon the presence of property within the state instead of
upon the financial rating of a foreign debtor, a fact which would
be difficult to prove, still such a condition is not a convincing
reason for permitting local attachments which may be circum-
vented either by an ancillary receivership or by an administration
in bankruptcy. The distinction lacks merit. Recognition of the
need for equality is more fundamental than to depend upon a
choice of procedure. Distrust of courts of sister states and their
receivers sounds strange from the mouths of those who are not
only the source but also the object of distrust. The extent to
which this pose rests upon the advantage which its maintenance
offers to courts in the form of patronage in appointing ancillary
receivers and to the bar and the community in additional fees and
costs of ancillary administrations are considerations which should
not be obscured in the camouflage of solicitude for the interests of
local creditors.
It may be that during the early days of the Republic when
lanes of commerce were tedious and business was localized to an
extent far greater than it is today, the doctrine in favor of local
creditors with which courts are saturated was not so pernicious.
Sheer distance was an ever present and formidable obstacle to
participation in remote receiverships. Physical conditions as well
as political concepts combined to justify the decisions. They crys-
tallized colonial thought into rules of law rationalized by argu-
ments concerning territoriality and independence of the various
state legal systems.
Today, however, much of this has changed. Business has at
least kept pace with improvements in transportation and com-
munication. The creditor and debtor public is the nation and be-
yond. A business failure in Chicago or New York may have
repercussions nation wide-to speak moderately. But the courts.
94People v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, (1900) 161 N. Y. 492, 55
N. E. 1053.
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neither state nor national, have advanced with the economic evo-
lution. They still regard receiverships as chiefly of local concern,
and extend to the financial security of home folk a solicitude
which is disproportionate to its need and inimical to the good of
creditors generally.
Yet local citizens experience the same unequal treatment when
a resident merchant or corporation with assets scattered among
various states is placed in the hands of a receiver. So while the
enforcement of the rule may benefit one creditor it may severely
injure his neighbor. It acts as a boomerang, but without the
merit of always returning to the same person. In the administra-
tion of any receivership which involves the recovery of foreign
assets, its existence is an actual menace.
If the receivership device is to be modernized, cooperation
among courts of the various states and districts is imperative.
They must consider the problem in a broader light. A receiver
appointed by the court of a sister state or district must no longer
be regarded as an alien who would bankrupt local merchants by
the withdrawal of assets to foreign shores. It is a matter of
national economics rather than of local opportunism, but in which
the welfare of the community is ultimately better served by the
granting rather than by the denial of comity.
SUGGESTED LEGISLATION
How can a change in the treatment accorded a foreign re-
ceiver best be brought about? Panaceas are difficult to find. A
uniform state statute extending comity would probably stand
slight chance of adoption.95 The ancillary receivership is cumber-
some, expensive and in most cases should be unnecessary-cer-
tainly as far as recognition of a foreign receivership is concerned.
The common-law assignment device has proved of some practical
95See discussion supra pp. 717-19. But see the Missouri legislation
supra note no. 54. Notice the effect which public interest has had in cur-
tailing the growth of the state rule: supra note no. 56. In refusing to
extend the rule of local preference to insurance cases the court in Martyne
v. Am. Union Fire Ins. Co., (1915) 216 N. Y. 183, 193, 110 N. E. 502 said:
"The commercial relations between corporations and citizens of the different
states are constantly increasing in extent. They are not only more and
more extended, but more and more intimate and inter-dependent. The trans-
actions of a corporation of a foreign state doing business in this state are
dependent upon our statute law and generally in the absence of a statutory
rule upon the rule of comity. The reasons for extending the rule of comity
between the states are constantly increasing. It should when practicable be
extended, and not curtailed."
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benefit; however, no superior sanction of the Supreme Court has
forced states into line and required its recognition. Trhe statutory
method is of doubtful merit since in America such assignments ex
proprio vigore are accorded io extraterritorial effect.
However, a remedy may be suggested for federal courts. As
to them there are two matters of concern: first, to remove the
restriction against foreign actions; second, to require extraterri-
torial recognition of property rights sued on by foreign receivers.
A definite step forward was taken when jurisdiction in a small
class of receiverships was extended beyond the arbitrary lines of
federal districts into certain contiguous ones. 6 This legislation
is a recognition of the inadequacy of the district as a unit for
receivership purposes. But that is not sufficient. Although the
matter could be handled by the courts, probably the Supreme Court
is correct in saying that it is now more properly a subject for
legislation.17  Congress, then, should provide that a receiver ap-
pointed in one district shall be permitted to sue in any other one
to the extent of the powers which were conferred upon him in the
jurisdiction of his appointment. s  It should further permit state
receivers to sue in federal courts on the basis of diverse citizen-
ship. 9
These provisions would entitle a federal receiver to litigate
actions abroad and to have them settled on their merits measured
by the law of his place of appointment. 109 They would similarly
96Supra note no. 42.97Great Western Mining Co. v. Harris, (1904) 198 U. S. 561, 25 Sup.
Ct. 770, 49 L. Ed. 1163. See also Martyne v. Am. Union Fire Ins. Co.,
(1915) 216 N. Y. 183, 110 N. E. 502.98The proposal referred to supra note no. 43 differs somewhat: "Every
receiver or manager of any property appointed by any court or judge of the
United States or of any of the several States of the United States or of any
of the property of which lie is the receiver or manager, in the same manner
and to the same extent as the owner of such property might or could have
sued with respect thereto had no receiver or manager of such property been
appointed." H. R. 9999; supra note no. 43.99See Report of the Standing Comm. on Jurisprudence and Law Reform
of the American Bar Association, against proposed legislation, S. 939 which
would abolish federal jurisdiction in controversies between citizens of dif-
ferent states. Advance Program of the Am. Bar Ass'n 1932, pp. 168-174;
Lmiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, Comments by Members of Chicago
University Law Faculty, (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 59. For limitations con-
tained in the present act see: Mar. 3. 1911, sec. 51. 36 Stat. at L. 1101;
Barnes Fed. Code 1919, sec. 813; Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs,(1927) 274 U. S. 208, 47 Sup. Ct. 578, 71 L. Ed. 1002.10 In the New York proposal the matter of inconvenience in proving
claims was discussed thus: Mr. Blanc. "Our committee gave that subject
careful thought, because, of course, we do not want to do any such thing.
As a matter of fact, in the situation which exists today the local claimant
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aid a state receiver. Local law would not usually be involved.
-{owever, the law of the situs would prevail as to the form and
validity of instruments, their recording, and the capacity of par-
ties. Thus accepted rules of conflict of laws would not be vio-
lated,1' 1 yet a general forum would be furnished in which the
local-creditor defense could not be raised.
The benefits which this change alone would bring to federal
and to state receivers should sufficiently justify its enactment.
However, as a means for defeating attachments in state courts, it
might not suffice. From this standpoint the defect in the proposal
is that it would convey no present legal interests in foreign prop-
erty, but only a power to reduce such assets to possession; nor
would it necessarily require extraterritorial recognition of foreign
receiverships by state courts.
But extraterritorial recognition ex proprio vigore is difficult
to obtain. The statute might provide for enlarging territorial
jurisdiction in receivership cases to include the entire nation. The
primary benefit of this, of course, would be in the field of admini-
stration. Such legislation has already been strongly advocated.102
That the administrative advantage which it offers would encour-
age the filing of a large number of friendly receiverships in fed-
eral courts should recommend rather than inveigh against its en-
actment. No constitutional impediment stands in its way.'03  Yet,
however meritorious territorial expansion may be for other fea-
tures of federal receiverships, it would probably not solve the juris-
dictional conflict which exists between state and federal courts. It
might still be necessary for a federal receiver to take actual prior
possession in order to protect his interests.'
does not prove his claim in the ancillary jurisdiction. He ordinarily proves
his claim before i master, sent into that jurisdiction by the court of primaryjurisdiction, and our conception is that that again is a subject which the
courts will deal with in a way convenient for the claimant. Our plan and
our thought is that what will happen will be that a master will be sent by
the court who is running this receivership into whatever districts exist, in
order that gentlemen who live there may prove their claims conveniently,
or will adopt some other machinery conformable to the economical and
just administration of equity." Hearings before Comm. on the Judiciary
etc., supra note no. 43, p. 11.
0'0 American Law Institute, Conflict of Laws Restatement sees. 238-
244, 246, 247, 275-278. But see supra note no. 7.02Supra note no. 43. H. R. 10,000.0 3sec. 1 of Art. 3 and Sec. 8 of Art. 1 of the U. S. Constitution. For
a discussion of the constitutionality of extending the jurisdiction of federal
courts see Annual Report of Special Committee on Equity Receiverships,(1927) Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N. Y. 304 et seq.
'
0 4See: Harkin v. Brundage, (1927) 276 U. S. 36, 48 Sup. Ct. 268, 72
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In addition to extending the jurisdiction of federal courts in
receivership cases the statute might endow receivers with title.
Yet it cannot be strongly urged that the use of this device would
materially change the situation. Under such legislation jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter would still be concurrent. There is
nothing sacrosanct or omnipotent about the concept of title. TPihe
battleground would be in the state courts. In local attachment
suits state tribunals could support their retention of property on
priority of actual possession.105 Against this time-honored pref-
erence title might be offered as an expedient. The traditional
respect which courts have for transfers which are made by the
law of the territorial sovereign 0 6 might conciliate state doctrine
and justify an extension of comity hitherto denied. The fact
and purpose of the federal legislation might of themselves be
somewhat persuasive. But the title argument is considerably
weakened by the fact of overlapping sovereignties. It could easily
be brushed aside by a hostile state court.
Another suggestion would be to expand the exclusive federal
jurisdiction which exists in bankruptcy 07 so as to include the
L. Ed. 457; Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, (1910) 241 U. S. 440, 447, 36
Sup. Ct. 637, 641, 60 L. Ed. 1084; Palmer v. Texas, (1909) 212 U. S. 118,
29 Sup. Ct. 230, 53 L. Ed. 435; Wabash R. R. v. Adelbert College, (1909)
208 U. S. 38, 28 Sup. Ct. 182, 52 L. Ed. 379; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Lake Street R. R. Co., (1900) 177 U. S. 51, 20 Sup. Ct. 564, 44 L. Ed. 067;
Ward v. Foulkrod, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1920) 264 Fed. 627; O'Neil v. Welsh,
(C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1917) 245 Fed. 261; Knott v. Evening Post Co., (C.C. Ky.
1903) 124 Fed. 342; Wilmer v. Atlanta & Richmond Airline Ry. Co., (C.C.
Ga. 1875) Fed. Cas. No. 17,775, 80; (1927) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 70.
1olSee ibid.
10GCodified in American Law Institute Conflict of Laws Restatement
sees. 236, 237, 277, 278.107Art. 1, sec. 8, U. S. constitution. The recent amendments to the
bankruptcy act have made some use of this device. The sections which
relate to compositions and extensions of "any person excepting a corpora-
tion" and to farmers are less significant,. since they apply to a field in
which receiverships ordinarily do not function. Davis'v. Hayden, (C.C.A.
4th Cir. 1916) 238 Fed. 734; Hogsett v. Thompson, (1917) 258 Pa. St. 85,
101 Atl. 941. Cf. Shapiro v. Wilgus, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1931) 55 F. (2d)
234. However, under the railroad reorganization section (sec. 77, Mar. 3.
1933, ch. 204, sec. 1, 47 Stat. at L.) appears the following: "(a) . . . If
the petition is so approved, the court in which such order approving the
petition is entered shall, during the pendency of the proceedings under this
section and for the purposes thereof, have exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor and its property wherever located." "(k) If a receiver of all or
any part of the property of a corporation has been appointed by a federal
or state court, whether before or after this chapter takes effect, the rail-
road corporation may nevetheless file a petition or answer under this section
at any time thereafter, but if it does so and the petition is approved the
trustee or trustees appointed under the provisions of this section shall be
entitled forthwith to possession of such property, and the judge shall make
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entire field of insolvency litigation. This would transfer to the
federal system a large portion of equity receivership subject-
matter involving no question of diverse citizenship. It would
partially solve the conflict by the process of elimination. The
constitutionality of such legislation would rest in the Supreme
Court's power of interpretation. However, regardless of the
merit or demerit of developing this federal function, its proposal
as a cure for the evil which is under consideration would be both
partial and over drastic.
This seems to leave as the most practical suggestion the fed-
eral legislation as it was first proposed-a privilege of suing in
foreign districts granted to all federal receivers, and to state re-
ceivers on the basis of diverse citizenship. Even though it would
not entirely solve the problem, this method would furnish an
opening wedge toward a broader comity in a field where it would
achieve the largest amount of good. The present doctrine, which
at one time may have served a political and economic need, has
little except short-sighted selfishness to recommend it today, when
the conditions upon which it was founded are matters only of
history and reminiscence. As the law stands it is an archaic sur-
vival of a provincial culture-redolent of the past, symbolic of an
individualistic, pioneer society.108
such orders as he may deem equitable for the protection of obligations
incurred by the receiver and for the payment of such reasonable adminis-
trative expenses and allowances in the prior proceeding as may be fixed
by the court appointing said receiver within maximum limits approved by
the commission."
The limited application of these provisions (railroad reorganization)
will, of course, not solve the problem at hand. However, it demonstrates
the possibilities inherent in the bankruptcy act for combating sectionalism
in insolvency litigation and administraton. Perhaps a general extension of
this device to the receivership field may become advisable. Certainly no
time is riper than now to rid finance of provincialism. The present prob-
lem, though, is much simpler.
For further discussion see Billig, Corporate Reorganization: Equity v.
Bankruptcy, (1933) 17 MINN0soTA LAW RvriEw 237, especially pp. 253-757.0 8See Hacket, A Possible Future Status of Foreign Assignments to
Creditors, (1900) 13 Harv. L. Rev. 484.
